Measurement error in health and disability status has been widely accepted as a central problem for social science research. Long-standing debates about the prevalence of disability, the role of health in labor market outcomes, and the influence of federal disability policy on declining employment rates have all emphasized issues regarding the reliability of self-reported disability. In addition to random error, inaccuracy in survey datasets may be produced by a host of economic, social, and psychological incentives that can lead respondents to misreport work capacity.
Introduction
Measuring employment rates among the disabled has been a matter of intense concern among policy analysts, especially since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990. Most studies rely on self-reported health information to analyze relationships between employment and disability. Burkhauser et al. (2002) , for example, make extensive use of survey questions of the general form: "Does a health impairment limit the kind or amount of work you can perform?"
Evidence from these studies suggests that employment rates between the nondisabled and disabled have widened substantially since the induction of the ADA. Yet reporting errors in disability status contaminate estimates of conditional employment rates. Citing "grave concerns about the accuracy and reliability of widely disseminated information about employment rates among people with disabilities," the National Council on Disability (NCD, 2002) warns that disability measurement error "could lead to ine¤ective or even dangerous public policy decisions."
In this paper, we develop a nonparametric foundation for assessing how di¤erent assumptions on the reporting error process a¤ect inferences on the employment gap between the disabled and nondisabled. Measurement error in health status has been accepted as a central problem for social science research (e.g., Institute of Medicine, 2002; Mathiowetz and Wunderlich, 2000; U.S. General Accounting O¢ ce, 1997). Twenty years ago, Anderson and Burkhauser (1984) characterized the measurement of work capacity in survey datasets as "the major unsettled issue in the empirical literature on the labor supply of older workers," and the debates have only intensi…ed over time.
Prominent debates about the prevalence of disability, the role of health in labor market decisions, and the in ‡uence of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) policy on declining labor force participation rates have all emphasized issues regarding the reliability of self-reported disability information. Bound (1991) provides an illuminating analyses of the econometric issues surrounding disability reporting errors.
There is widespread concern, in particular, about the accuracy of self-reported disability status in survey datasets. While most studies treat self-reports of work limitation as fully accurate, the literature encompasses a wide range of views on reporting errors. Some researchers contend that disability reporting is largely reliable (e.g., Stern, 1989; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999; Benitez-Silva et al., 2004) , while others contend that strong economic and psychological incentives to misreport disability -coupled with potential di¢ culties with interpreting the survey questionsrender the self-reports nearly devoid of content (e.g., Myers, 1982; Bowe, 1993; Hale, 2001) . The psychology literature discusses the potential medical role of "negative a¤ectivity" in respondents' self-assessments of disability status (see, e.g., Watson and Clark, 1984) . The unknown reliability of proxy or imputed responses raises further concerns (Lee et al., 2004) .
Others take middle ground positions by formally treating self-reports as reliable for members of certain subpopulations but not others. Many researchers, for example, have emphasized that eligibility for disability transfers is speci…cally tied to diminished work capacity. Bound and Burkhauser (1999, p. 3446) suggest the possibility that "those who apply for SSDI and especially those who are awarded bene…ts tend to exaggerate the extent of their work limitations." More generally, many have suggested that the threshold for claiming disability may be lower for those who …nd themselves out of the labor force, either voluntarily or involuntarily (e.g., Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) , O'Donnell (1999) , and Kreider (1999 Kreider ( , 2000 ). Gordon and Blinder (1980) conclude that their estimated e¤ect of 'left last job for health reasons' on early retirement is "too huge to be believed."
Departing from the existing disability and employment literature, we do not focus on providing point estimates of the employment gap between the disabled and nondisabled. Instead, we derive analytic bounds that allow us to assess the identifying power of di¤erent assumptions on the disability reporting error process within a unifying methodological framework. We estimate conditional employment probabilities using information on respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). After describing the data in Section 2, we formalize the identi…cation problem created by arbitrary misreporting in Section 3.
New methodological results allow us to assess the sensitivity of the identi…cation problem to variation in the nature and degree of corruption in a regressor, namely disability status. Our approach is similar in spirit to Horowitz and Manski (1995) who assess the problem of identifying a marginal distribution in corrupt data. We extend their approach to allow for corruption of a binary regressor in a conditional distribution. In this setting, we show how the classical assumption of exogenous or "nondi¤erential"measurement error considered by Aigner (1973) and Bollinger (1996) can be used to tighten the upper bound on the employment gap.
In Section 4, we introduce the notion of partial veri…cation of reports within particular observed subgroups (e.g., workers or disability bene…ciaries). By allowing for some classi…cation errors within partially veri…ed subgroups, we depart from both the parametric disability literature (e.g., Kreider, 1999; McGarry, 2004) and nonparametric bounds literature (e.g., Horowitz and Manski, 1998; Dominitz and Sherman, 2004) which assume fully accurate reporting within veri…ed subgroups.
Section 5 considers the identifying power of monotonicity restrictions that link employment and disability to certain covariates such as age or the likelihood of being approved for disability bene…ts.
Within this framework, we introduce a nonparametric method for correcting the …nite-sample bias of the analog estimator of Manski and Pepper's (2000) monotone instrumental variables (MIV)
bound. Under relatively weak assumptions, our results support contentions in the literature that nonworkers systematically overreport disability. Section 6 concludes.
Data
Our main analysis uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). By coupling detailed information about health and disability, work history, and participation in government transfer programs with a panel design, the HRS and SIPP are perhaps the two most important data sources for studying the e¤ects of health status and public policy on work outcomes. In Section 5, we further check the robustness of our results using the publicly released 5% extract from the 2000 Decennial Census of Population.
The HRS is a nationally representative panel survey of households whose heads were nearing retirement age (aged 51-61) in 1992-93. We use self-reported health and labor force participation information from all 12,503 respondents aged 40 or older. We also record each respondent's years of schooling, occupation, race, gender, receipt of government assistance for a disability, and whether the responses came from a proxy respondent. As part of our identi…cation strategy, some of our analysis also incorporates reported health and employment information from the second wave which was conducted two years after the …rst wave.
The SIPP is a nationally representative longitudinal survey covering the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population. We utilize data from the …rst wave of the 1996 panel, a nationally representative sample of 36,800 households. Because respondents older than 69 were not asked about work limitations, we restrict the SIPP sample to the 29,807 individuals between the ages of 40 and 69. Table 1A displays means and standard deviations. In the HRS, 21:9% of the sample responded that an impairment limits or precludes paid work, with 66:3% currently working for pay. The corresponding fractions in the SIPP data are 18:8% and 69:5%, respectively. These di¤erences between the two surveys primarily re ‡ect di¤erences in the surveyed age distributions (see the last column in Table 1A ). Table 1B presents labor force participation rates by self-assessed work limitation and age. In the HRS, the employment rate among those reporting to be disabled is 0:294 compared with 0:766 for those reporting to be nondisabled. The di¤erence in employment rates by reported disability status -i.e., the employment gap -is thus 0:472. The corresponding employment gap in the SIPP is 0:482.
The Identi…cation Problem
To infer the employment gap between the disabled and nondisabled, we consider what self-reports reveal about true disability as measured by current social norms or the particular research question of interest. Clearly, survey designers have an expectation that respondents can place questions about work limitation in a reasonable social context. Some respondents may use thresholds di¤erent than those implied by the social norms, but the data do not reveal these respondents.
To evaluate the implications of invalid response in corrupt data, we introduce notation that distinguishes between self-reports and accurate reports. Let L = 1 indicate that the respondent is employed, with L = 0 otherwise. Similarly, let X = 1 indicate that the respondent reports being limited in the ability to work, and let W = 1 indicate that the individual is truly limited in the ability to work relative to social norms (or other speci…ed criterion). Finally, let Z indicate whether a respondent provides accurate information, with Z = 1 if W = X and Z = 0 otherwise. We are interested in learning how the employment rate varies by true disability status:
The data reveal P (L = 1jX) but not P (L = 1jW ). Therefore, is not identi…ed by the sampling process. In particular, Bayes'Theorem implies:
= P (L = 1; X = 1) + P (L = 1; X = 0; Z = 0) P (L = 1; X = 1; Z = 0) P (X = 1) + P (X = 0; Z = 0) P (X = 1; Z = 0) :
The data identify the fraction who self-report disability, P (X = 1), and the joint probability of being employed and claiming to be disabled, P (L = 1; X = 1); but they do not reveal the distribution of accurate reporters. Some unknown fraction of respondents, P (X = 1; Z = 0), inaccurately report being disabled (false positives) while others, P (X = 0; Z = 0), inaccurately report being nondisabled (false negatives). In the absence of restrictions on misreporting, the data are uninformative; we only know that the conditional employment rate lies between 0 and 1.
Nondi¤erential Classi…cation Errors
The classical prescription used to address these identi…cation problems is to assume that the reporting error process is exogenous. In particular, suppose that reporting errors are independent of the employment outcome conditional on true disability status:
This type of "nondi¤erential" classi…cation error has been studied by Aigner (1973) and Bollinger (1996) . When the independence assumption (3) holds, Bollinger's Theorem 1 applied to a binary outcome can be used to show that is bounded away from zero (in this case from above) by the reported employment gap P (L = 1jX = 1) P (L = 1jX = 0) (< 0) (proof available upon request).
This independence assumption clearly confers strong identifying power. Using the HRS data, for example, is estimated to be less than 0:47, re ‡ecting well-known attenuation bias associated with random measurement error.
While the nondi¤erential measurement error assumption is powerful, Bound et al. (2001, p. 3725) note that the assumption is strong and often implausible. In our context, the assumption requires that conditional on true disability status, unemployed respondents are no more likely to report being disabled than employed respondents. This assumption e¤ectively rules out, for example, the possibility that labor market outcomes a¤ect respondents' perceptions of their disability status or that employment outcomes may be associated with perceived disability status in addition to true disability status. We proceed under the premise that the assumption of nondi¤erential errors (3) may not hold in this application.
Lower Bound Accurate Reporting Rate
To characterize the identi…cation problem in the absence of the nondi¤erential classi…cation errors assumption, it is useful to consider what can be learned with a known lower bound on the fraction of respondents that accurately report disability status. In particular, suppose
where v is an known lower bound on the accurate reporting rate. Horowitz and Manski (1995) apply this degree assumption when assessing the problem of identifying a marginal distribution in corrupt data.
By varying the value of v, we can e¤ectively consider the wide range of views characterizing the debate on inaccurate reporting. Those willing to assume that all reports are accurate can set v = 1, in which case the sampling process identi…es the conditional employment rates. Those believing that all reports are potentially inaccurate can set v = 0, in which case the sampling process is uninformative. Middle ground positions can be evaluated by setting v between 0 and 1.
The lower bound in Equation (4) implies restrictions on the unknown joint distributions in
Equation (2). In particular, if the degree of misreporting is no greater than some known fraction,
1 v, the following sharp "degree bounds" apply (see the appendix for a proof):
Then P (L = 1jW = 1) is bounded sharply as follows:
To estimate the bounds in Proposition 1, we simply replace the population probabilities with sample analogs. Bounds for P (L = 1jW = 0) are obtained by replacing X = 1 with X = 0 and vice versa in the proposition. An upper (lower) bound on can be found by subtracting the Proposition 1 lower (upper) bound on P (L = 1jW = 0) from the Proposition 1 upper (lower) bound on P (L = 1jW = 1). Although these bounds on are intuitive and simple to compute, they are not sharp. In the appendix, we show how the constraint P (Z = 1) v places further restrictions on and formalize sharp bounds.
Note that when the lower bound fraction of accurate reporters is relatively small, the bounds on the conditional employment rates are uninformative. For example, when the degree of misreporting can exceed the fraction of respondents reporting to be disabled workers, (1 v) P (L = 1; X = 1), the lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1) is zero. After all, despite self-reports to the contrary, all of these respondents may be nondisabled. Similarly, the upper bound is 1 when
The striking feature of the estimates from the HRS sample is that these bounds are uninformative across a large range of values for v. When v = 0, the employment gap can lie anywhere between 1 and 1. The HRS data remain uninformative unless it is known that the accurate reporting rate exceeds 0:41, and the lower bound remains at 1 unless v exceeds 0:82. The sign of is identi…ed as negative (i.e., the data reveal that the disabled are less likely to work than the nondisabled) only if at least 88 percent of the respondents are known to provide accurate reports. Results are similar for the SIPP data. Under weak assumptions on the degree of accurate reporting, the data provide only modest information on the true employment rates of interest.
Nonparametric Partial Veri…cation Model
Concerns about misreporting focus primarily on …nancial and social incentives for certain types of respondents to exaggerate the extent of lost work capacity. First, eligibility into some government assistance programs (e.g., SSDI) is contingent on being su¢ ciently work impaired. In addition to monthly cash bene…ts, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) bene…ciaries are immediately eligible for Medicaid bene…ts, and SSDI bene…ciaries become eligible for Medicare bene…ts after a two-year waiting period. Second, some people may feel social pressure to participate in the labor force until normal retirement age unless their ability to work is impaired (see Bound, 1991) . Those who …nd themselves out of work (or prefer not to work) may feel more compelled to claim that a functional limitation (e.g., di¢ culty climbing stairs) interferes with the ability to work.
Short of assuming that all respondents provide accurate self-reports, several studies have iden-ti…ed the true disability rate by combining distributional restrictions with assumptions that certain types of respondents provide accurate reports. The existing literature provides a number of restrictions (see, e.g., Bound and Burkhauser, 1999) . Kreider (1999) least one of these criteria. Although members of these groups may face little incentive to misreport, we allow for the possibility of some reporting errors within veri…ed groups. Note that given the high thresholds and restrictive screening process used in government disability programs, verifying a work limitation among bene…ciaries is not tantamount to assuming that the limitation is su¢ ciently severe to warrant eligibility into the program.
Formally, let Y = 1 indicate that a respondent belongs to a "veri…ed" subgroup, with Y = 0 otherwise. At least some fraction v y of the self-reports in such groups are assumed accurate:
No other restrictions are imposed on the error process within veri…ed groups, and no prior information exists for the error process in the unveri…ed groups. Under these assumptions, we derive the following proposition (see the appendix for a proof):
is bounded sharply as follows: As before, bounds for P (L = 1jW = 0) are obtained by replacing X = 1 with X = 0, and vice versa, and we can compute bounds on by subtracting the appropriate bound on P (L = 1jW = 0) from the appropriate bound on P (L = 1jW = 1). Given veri…cation in Proposition 2, these bounds on are sharp.
Under the assumption of fully accurate reporting within veri…ed subgroups, v y = 1, these bounds simplify. In particular, it follows that if v y = 1, we have 
The width of these bounds depends on the joint distribution of the observed random variables, fL; X; Y g. An alternative derivation of the result in this corollary is provided in the Horowitz and Manski (1998) bound for regressor censoring.
Results
Empirical results are presented in Table 2 for the HRS and SIPP data. Columns 
Monotonicity Restrictions
We next formalize the notion that the employment rate may be known to vary monotonically with certain covariates such as age or the likelihood of being approved for federal disability insurance bene…ts. Suppose, for example, that the conditional employment rate is nonincreasing with age:
age 1 age 0 age 2 =) P (L = 1jW; age 2 ) P (L = 1jW; age 0 ) P (L = 1jW; age 1 )
for all age 1 age 0 and all age 0 age 2 .
With corrupt data, the conditional probabilities in Equation (7) are not identi…ed. However, we can bound these probabilities using the methods described above. Let LB(age) and U B(age) be the known lower and upper bounds, respectively, given the available information on P (L = 1jW; age).
Then the monotone instrumental variable restriction (MIV) formalized in Manski and Pepper (2000,
Proposition 1) implies:
sup age 2 age 0 LB(age 2 ) P (L = 1jW; age 0 ) inf
There are no other restrictions implied by the MIV assumption. These MIV models are not nested in the usual parametric models (e.g., probit models which impose di¤erent assumptions such as homogeneity), nor vice versa.
The MIV bound on the conditional employment rate is obtained using the law of total probability. Assuming the MIV age is a …nite set, the following bounds apply:
Proposition 3. If the conditional employment rate is weakly decreasing with the MIV age, then:
The MIV assumption alone has no identifying power, so we combine this assumption with the previous veri…cation assumptions. In this setting, MIV can have identifying power if either the veri…cation probability or an observed conditional employment rate is not monotonic with age.
Finite Sample Bias
Estimation of the MIV bounds is complicated by the fact one must impose the monotonicity restrictions in Equation (8) To address this concern, we present a modi…ed MIV estimator that directly measures and accounts for this …nite sample bias using the nonparametric bootstrap correction (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) . To illustrate the basic idea, let T n be a consistent analog estimator of some unknown parameter such that the bias of this estimator is b n = E(T n ) . Using the bootstrap distribution of T n , one can estimate this bias as In our setting, the …nite bias is simulated from the bootstrap distributions of the estimated Proposition 2 bounds for each age group. To estimate these bounds using the HRS, we divide the sample into 25 age groups containing 500 respondents per group (503 in the oldest group). For the SIPP sample, each age represents its own MIV group with cell sizes ranging from to n=642 to n=1692 (mean=994). Then for each cell, the veri…cation bounds -which are functions of various nonparametrically estimable probabilities -are estimated and the MIV restrictions in Equation (8) are applied. Figure 1 , for example, displays the lower bound estimate and bootstrap distribution of P (L = 1jW = 1) found using the HRS sample under the assumption that workers'responses are valid. The bias of the MIV estimator is estimated from these bootstrap sampling distributions.
To clarify the mechanics of our approach, let the parameter of interest, , be the Proposition 3 lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1) (other cases are analogous), let LB n (j) be the estimated Proposition 2 lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1; Age = j) for each age group j = 1; :::; J (see Figure   1 , for example), and let T n be the MIV lower bound estimate across all age groups. In particular,
is the fraction of respondents in age group j. The bias b n is estimated using the bootstrap sampling distribution of LB n (j). The …rst step is to randomly draw with replacement from the empirical distribution to obtain K independent pseudosamples of the original data. Then, using these samples, compute a set of K lower bound MIV estimates of P (L = 1jW = 1). Let T k n , k = 1; :::; K, be the K lower bound bootstrap estimates and let E (T n ) = 1 K P K k=1 T k n be the expected lower bound from the bootstrap distribution. Finally, compute the estimated bias, b b, and the bias-corrected MIV estimator, T c n = 2T n E (T n ). negligible at less than 0:001. In contrast, the estimated bias is 2:9 percentage points in the HRS and 2:5 percentage points in the SIPP.
Results
Thus, if employment weakly decreases with age, these …ndings suggest that conventional models which presume valid self-reports are likely to be misspeci…ed. Since the unveri…ed group consists of nonworkers who claim to be disabled, these …ndings support concerns in the literature that members of this group may systematically over-report disability. In addition, notice also that this …nding is inconsistent with the nondi¤erential independence assumption, P (X = 1jW ) = P (X = 1jW; L), discussed in Section 3.1.
To further assess the sensitivity of this …nding, we applied two other MIV assumptions in the HRS sample. First, we treated age as an MIV in disability instead of employment. Second, instead of age, a natural MIV that exploits information from a variety of individual characteristics in the HRS data can be constructed as the outcome of a respondent's Disability Insurance application decision. In particular, let the categorical variable A equal 0 if the respondent has not applied for disability bene…ts, 1 if a disability application was rejected, 2 if an application was accepted after appeal, and 3 if an application was accepted immediately. Using A as the dependent variable, we constructed an MIV as …tted values from an ordered probit model of the application outcome. The speci…cation includes indicators for a large set of physician-diagnosed health conditions and ADL limitations, an indicator for subsequent mortality (died before wave 2), an indicator for ideal body mass, age, education, race, gender, marital status, veteran status, and asset level (details from this regression are available upon request). We de…ne the ideal range to be 20-25 kilograms per meter squared following Fahey et al. (1997) . In both of these cases, we …nd that the lower bound MIV estimator exceeds the self-reported employment gap. For example, given full veri…cation within the previously discussed subgroups, the 90% con…dence interval for narrows to [ 0:443; 0:289] after the disability application MIV is imposed (500 observations per cell).
Consistent with the past literature, we have maintained the assumption that all veri…ed respondents provide accurate reports of disability status. While these veri…ed subgroups may not have economic or social incentives to systematically misreport, there may still exist some inaccurate responses: respondents may have di¢ culties in answering subjective questions, valid reports can be miscoded, and so forth.
Proxy reports among veri…ed groups may be especially concerning. Conceptual di¢ culties in answering questions about disability status may be compounded for respondents answering on behalf of others. Still, while proxy respondents may have less information about the extent of an impairment or its changing dynamics, they may also have less incentive to misreport. Lee et al. (2004) compare estimates of the number of disabled by respondent type in an environment in which self-response versus proxy was randomized. Among their primary …ndings, self-respondents and proxy respondents were equally likely to report disability during the initial interview, but proxy respondents were less likely to report disability in the second wave of the survey. The type of proxy mattered as spouses tended to give more consistent responses. This consistency could signify less misreporting among spouse proxies, or it could signify that misreporting among individuals tends to spill over to the spouse's report. In our HRS sample, less than 5% of the responses came from proxy respondents. Of those cases, the vast majority (over 90%) were spouses. In our SIPP sample, nearly 30% of the responses came from proxies (of undocumented type).
We In summary, evidence that some respondents systematically overreport disability is replicated across di¤erent data and MIV assumptions and is robust to departures from the assumption of fully accurate reporting within veri…ed groups.
Conclusion
Concerns :
Di¤erentiating this bound with respect to a and b reveals that the lower bound is minimized when b = and the upper bound is maximized with a = . Proposition 2 follows.
Sharp degree bounds on
Suppose one has prior information on the maximum degree of inaccurate responses, P (Z = 1) v: Using the same logic as in Proposition 1, we can also bound P (L = 1jW = 0):
Combining Equations (10) Over part of the range for v, these bounds di¤er from the naive bounds obtained directly from Proposition 1. Consider, for example, the lower bound in Proposition 1A. If the value of the unknown parameter b that minimizes the …rst expression (i.e., the lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1)) di¤ers from the value of b that maximizes the second expression (i.e., the upper bound on P (L = 1jW = 0)), the two bounds on will di¤er and the Proposition 1A bounds will be tighter.
The two bounds will be identical when the lower bound on P (L = 1jW = 1) and the upper bound on P (L = 1jW = 0) are realized at same value of the unknown parameter b. 
